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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
HENRY LEE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 920566-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-10(2) provides: 
Force used in executing warrant — Notice of authority 
prerequisite, when. 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, conveyance, 
compartment or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to 
enter: 
• • • 
<2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in 
the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be quickly disposed of, 
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any 
person if notice were given. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial judge err in denying appellant's 
motion to suppress in light of the changed circumstances at the 
time the search warrant was executed? 
Standard of review. Although Utah cases have stated that 
the reviewing court must give deference to the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause, those decisions refer specifically 
to the magistrate's determination of probable cause and not to the 
determination that a no-knock warrant is appropriate. See State v. 
Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983), State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 
830, 833 (Utah App. 1991). No deference standard has been 
articulated in assessing a no-knock provision in the two lead cases 
from Utah appellate courts. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah 
App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah, 
September 28, 1992); State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988). 
The dangers presented by no-knock warrants and the 
requirement that "proof" be established before such warrants are 
issued suggest that deference should not be given to the 
2 
magistrate's decision to issue a no-knock warrant; review should be 
de novo. See also Judge Orme's concurrence in State v. Weaver. 817 
P.2d 830, 836 (Utah App. 1991): 
Either an affidavit establishes probable cause or it does 
not. No credibility issues exist; no evidence has to be 
weighed. Why should not the appellate court read the 
affidavit and decide for itself the conclusion to be 
drawn, like it would with a written contract? 
2. Was the evidence seized in violation of the United 
States constitution as the result of misrepresentations or 
omissions in the affidavit? 
a. Was material information omitted from the 
affidavit? 
b. Did the officer act intentionally or with 
a reckless disregard for the truth in omitting material 
information? 
c. With the omitted material information 
added, does the affidavit establish probable cause? 
Standard of Review. After inserting material omitted 
information, State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert, 
denied. 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct 1565, 94 L.Ed.2d 758 (1987), this 
Court reviews the affidavit "in a common sense manner and as a 
whole" to determine whether the magistrate had "a substantial basis 
for concluding that probable cause existed." State v. Weaver. 817 
P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991). It "need not defer to the trial 
court's finding" and instead makes "an independent review of the 
trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written 
3 
evidence." Id. The standard of review for any factual assessments 
underlying a determination that probable cause existed is a 
"clearly erroneous" standard; the conclusion that probable cause 
existed is a legal conclusion, and a correction of the error 
standard is applicable. See State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 468 n. 
8 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); State 
v. Stricklincr. No. 910621-CA, slip op. at 1-2 (Utah App. December 
3, 1992). 
3* Was the search warrant invalid under Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah constitution? 
a. Should the Acruilar-Spinelli test apply to 
probable cause determinations under Article I, section 14 
or the Utah constitution? 
b. Is the search warrant invalid as a result 
of omissions and failure to satisfy the Acruilar-Spinelli 
test? 
Standard of review. The issue as to the appropriate 
analysis under Article I, section 14 and the determination as to 
whether probable cause was established are questions of law subject 
to a "correction of error" standard; factual assessments underlying 
the determination are subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard. 
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 468 n. 8 (Utah App. 1991), cert, 
denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (1992); State v. Stricklina. No. 910621-CA 
slip op. at 1-2 (Utah App. December 3, 1992). 
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When reviewing an affidavit to determine whether it 
establishes probable cause as required by the Utah constitution, 
this Court should not defer to the magistrate's determination; 
instead, this Court should review the face of the affidavit to 
determine whether it establishes probable cause. See generally 
State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 835-36 (Orme, J., concurring). 
The deference given a magistrate's determination under 
the fourth amendment has been questioned by at least one member of 
this Court: 
Either an affidavit establishes probable cause or it does 
not. No credibility issues exist; no evidence has to be 
weighed. Why should not an appellate court read the 
affidavit and decide for itself the conclusion to be 
drawn, like it would with a written contract? 
Id. at 836. 
Rather than protecting fourth amendment values by 
encouraging officers to draft sufficient affidavits and magistrates 
to issue search warrants only where an affidavit clearly 
establishes probable cause, this deference can result in searches 
being upheld in borderline situations where the affidavit on its 
face has failed to establish probable cause. If the "substantial 
basis" test is interpreted to uphold affidavits where probable 
cause does not exist on the face of the warrant, fourth amendment 
requirements will not always be met. See Weaver, 817 P.2d at 836 
(Orme, J., concurring). 
4. If the exclusionary rule is not applicable, was 
there a sufficient nexus between Mr. Lee and the controlled 
5 
substance found in the bedroom near him to establish probable cause 
to arrest him? 
Standard of review. The standard of review for any 
factual assessments underlying a determination that probable cause 
existed is a "clearly erroneous" standard; the conclusion that 
probable cause existed is a legal conclusion, and a "correction of 
error" standard is applicable. See State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 
468 n. 8 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (1992); 
State v. Stricklincr, No. 910621-CA slip op. at 1-2 (Utah App. 
December 3, 1992)* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an information dated December 27, 1991, the State 
charged Henry Lee with unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), a 
third degree felony. R. 10-11. 
On March 17, 1992 defendant filed a motion to suppress 
all evidence seized in violation of his rights under the fourth 
amendment, and Article I, section 14 of the Utah constitution. R. 
27-31. Following an evidentiary hearing held on June 15, 1992, the 
trial court denied the motion. R. 39-42, 57-62. Defendant entered 
a conditional no contest plea pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 
935 (Utah App. 1988), specifically reserving his right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to suppress. R. 50-6. 
Defendant was sentenced to 90 days in the Salt Lake 
County Jail. R. 63-4. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer Brad Bassi swore out an affidavit for the search 
of premises at 1442 South Roberta Street (240 East) , and the person 
of Vera Mason. The search warrant was issued on a ,fno-knock" 
basis. R. 93; Defendant's Exhibit 1. A true and correct copy of 
the search warrant and affidavit is attached as Addendum A.1 
Appellant Henry Lee was not named in the warrant. R. 100-101. 
The affidavit was based on information from two 
unidentified sources. The first source was a probationer of 
Probation Officer Harvey Van Katwyk; the second was a confidential 
informant ("CI"). The affidavit states that Van Katwyk vouched for 
the reliability of his probationer. Aff. page two. The affiant 
vouched for the reliability of his CI. Aff. page 3. Affiant 
failed to disclose in the affidavit that CI was on probation, or 
that CI had at least one prior conviction for drug offenses. R. 
98-99. 
In requesting no-knock service, page four of the 
affidavit states: 
Your affiant prays for no-knock service of this 
warrant. Your affiant has reviewed the criminal history 
of DOWELL and he has a prior armed robbery. Further your 
affiant has been told that MASON has prior arrest for 
weapons and narcotic offenses. 
Your affiant also knows from training and 
experience that the items sought pursuant to this search 
warrant are easily destroyed, hidden or altered. Further 
your affiant fears any delay in the this[sic] service of 
defendants Exhibit 1, consisting of nine pages, is contained 
in the file in a separate manila envelope. This exhibit consists 
of the search warrant (cover page, Attachment A (items to be 
seized), and page two, followed by the affidavit (cover page, 
Attachment A (items to be seized), and pages two through five). 
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this search warrant will allow additional quantities of 
heroin and cocaine to be sold. 
Officer Bassi had no information concerning recent possession or 
use of weapons by Vera Mason, and no such assertion is contained in 
the affidavit. R. 121. The affidavit does not indicate that Mason 
had any convictions for weapons or drug offenses. R. 120. 
Officer Bassi was the supervising parole officer for the 
Joe Dowell referenced in the affidavit. Aff. page three. At the 
hearing on Mr. Lee's motion to suppress, Bassi testified as 
follows: 
Q. And included in that is the allegation — 
or the request that you made that you be allowed to 
execute the search warrant on a no-knock basis; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the primary reason for your request 
for that was the presumed presence of an individual in 
the residence named Joe Dowell; is that right? 
A. No, that's not correct. 
Q. What was the reason for which you asked 
the no- knock authorization on the warrant? 
A. The possibility of weapons in the 
residence. 
Q. Was there not specific reference in 
connection with that to an individual named Joe Dowell? 
A. There was reference to that. 
Q. There was an indication that he had a 
prior robbery arrest of some sort; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you, in fact, indicated in the 
affidavit that you believed Joe Dowell to be a dangerous 
person, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time of the execution of the search 
warrant you knew that Joe Dowell would not be present at 
the premises when you searched it; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And that's because you had him in custody 
in Adult Probation and Parole offices at the time of the 
execution of the warrant; is that right? 
A. That's also right. 
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R. 94:23-96:1. Joe Dowell was not named in the warrant. R. 100. 
There is no evidence in the record as to whether Officer Bassi 
intended at the time of the warrant's issuance to have Dowell under 
custody before exercising the warrant. 
The search warrant was executed on a no-knock basis. The 
issuing magistrate was not recontacted concerning the material 
change in circumstances resulting from the fact that Joe Dowell was 
in custody at the time of execution. R. 96. 
Henry Lee was on the premises at the time the warrant was 
executed. R. 87, 90. Lee emerged from a bedroom at the officers' 
request during the search. R. 92, 104-105. Lee was handcuffed, R. 
105-106, taken to the kitchen area and arrested for possession of 
narcotics, although no narcotics were found on the person of Lee. 
R. 109-110. Incident to his arrest, Lee was searched at the Salt 
Lake County Jail and syringes were seized. R. 113, 115-116. 
The room from which Lee emerged contained needles, a 
plate on the bed containing heroin cut in pieces, and other drug 
paraphernalia. R. 92. Another individual was found lying directly 
next to the bed, with one hand touching the bed. R. 106. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Probable cause must exist both at the time a warrant is 
issued and at the time the warrant is executed. Under the facts of 
this case, there was no basis for a no-knock warrant at the time 
the warrant was executed. Joe Dowell, the individual whose 
possible presence created the danger necessitating no-knock 
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execution, was in custody at the time the warrant was executed. 
Under the fourth amendment and under Utah statutory and 
constitutional law, the search warrant was invalid. 
The Leon "good faith" exception cannot save the seized 
evidence from the exclusionary rule. Officer Bassi swore out the 
affidavit, obtained the warrant, put Dowell in custody, and then 
executed the warrant. He was fully aware at the time of execution 
that there was no basis for no-knock execution. 
No Leon-type good faith exception should exist under the 
Utah constitution. The exclusionary rule is constitutionally 
required. Federal analysis under the fourth amendment to the 
contrary is troublesome and confusing, and should be rejected. 
The affidavit was invalid under the fourth amendment due 
to material omissions. Affiant failed to disclose that a 
confidential informant was a probationer with at least one prior 
conviction on drug-related charges. With the omitted material 
information added, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause. 
The affidavit was invalid under Article I, section 14 of 
the Utah constitution due to material omissions. Utah should apply 
the Aauilar-Spinelli test when analyzing affidavits under Article 
I, section 14. The affidavit failed to adequately show the basis 
of knowledge, veracity, and reliability of information received 
from informants. 
In all cases where the affidavit in support of a search 
warrant contains material misrepresentations or omissions, there 
can be no good faith execution. 
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There was no sufficient nexus to justify arrest of Mr. 
Lee. There was nothing at all to indicate that Mr. Lee had the 
intent to exercise dominion and control over the narcotics seized 
at the searched premises. Absent some additional factor allowing 
an inference of intent, Mr. Lee's arrest was improper. 
All evidence seized should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR 
EXECUTION OF A NO-KNOCK WARRANT AT THE 
TIME THE WARRANT WAS EXECUTED 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-10 provides: 
Force used in executing warrant — Notice of authority 
prerequisite, when. 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, conveyance, 
compartment or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to 
enter: 
• • • 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in 
the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be quickly disposed of, 
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any 
person if notice were given. 
Under the fourth amendment, officers are likewise 
precluded from unreasonable searches. Implicit in such 
reasonableness is the understanding that excessive force will not 
be utilized in executing a search warrant. "Unquestionably, notice 
is ordinarily required as a prerequisite to the gaining of entry by 
physical force.11 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(b) at 273 (2d 
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ed. 1987) (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 
1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958)). 
The purpose of requiring notice before entry is 
threefold: 
(1) the protection of an individual's private activities 
within his home, (2) the prevention of violence and 
physical injury to both police and occupants which may 
result from an unannounced police entry, and (3) the 
prevention of property damage resulting from forced 
entry. 
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d at 701. 
A. WITH DOWELL IN CUSTODY, THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT PROOF TO JUSTIFY NO-
KNOCK EXECUTION. 
1. Under Fourth Amendment. 
There is no dispute as to the fact that Joe Dowell was in 
custody in Officer Bassi's office at the time the search warrant 
was executed. Without the possibility of Dowell's presence, there 
is insufficient proof to justify execution of a no-knock warrant. 
Officer Bassi admitted at the suppression hearing that a no-knock 
warrant was requested due to the possible presence of Joe Dowell. 
Absent allegations concerning Dowell, the affidavit contains vague 
references to Vera Mason and standard recitations concerning 
destructibility of drugs. 
Although Utah has not addressed the issue, probable cause 
sufficient to support issuance of a search warrant must exist not 
only at the time the warrant is authorized, but also at the time it 
is executed. Many federal cases have expressed a "concern that 
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probable cause may dissipate between the time of a warrant's 
issuance and its execution." U.S. v. Bowling. 900 F.2d 926, 931 
(6th Cir.), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 L.Ed.2d 79 (1990). See 
also Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5(2) (1990 Repl. Vol.) (requiring that 
searches be conducted within ten days of warrant issuance). 
Bowling involved a search executed pursuant to warrant that 
occurred some two hours after an unproductive consensual search. 
The Sixth Circuit noted: 
The fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures would be an incomplete and highly 
manipulable safeguard if a neutral magistrate could not 
play the same impartial role in assessing continuing 
probable cause that he plays in determining probable 
cause to issue the warrant in the first place. Because 
no exigent circumstances are presented by the facts of 
this case, the officers should have refrained from the 
second search until a neutral magistrate determined that 
probable cause continued to exist. Notwithstanding the 
officers' failure to do this, the fruits of the second 
search are not to be suppressed if this court finds that 
a neutral magistrate would have determined that probable 
cause existed to conduct a second search despite prior 
fruitless consent search. 
Bowling, 900 F.2d at 933. The court upheld the search, but only 
because the consensual search was not as broad as the warrant 
search.2 
In the instant case, allegations concerning Vera Mason 
are insufficient to justify issuance of a no-knock warrant. Bassi 
asserts "your affiant has been told that MASON has prior arrest for 
weapons and narcotics related offenses." Aff. page four. Bassi 
does not disclose the source of this information, the recency of 
2The consensual search only lasted fifteen minutes, and no 
search of the subject's car occurred. 
13 
such alleged arrest or arrests, or whether any conviction was 
obtained. There is no indication whatsoever as to the reliability 
of this information. Bassi does not indicate that he believes the 
source to be reliable, or that he even believes the information 
himself. This hearsay allegation, with no indication of veracity, 
is insufficient proof to justify a no-knock warrant. In State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 
S.Ct 1565, 94 L.Ed.2d 758 (1987) the Supreme Court stated: 
The use of hearsay evidence to establish 
probable cause does not necessarily undercut the validity 
of the warrant. If the hearsay is reliable, and there is 
a substantial basis for giving it credence, it will 
support the issuance of a warrant. United States v. 
Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580-81, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2080, 29 
L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); accord State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 
135, 138, 514 P.2d 800, 802 (1973); State v. Treadwav, 28 
Utah 2d 160, 162-3, 499 P.2d 846, 847-48 (1972). 
Id. at 192. In the present case there is no basis for giving this 
hearsay credence, much less a substantial basis. Absent any 
indication as to recency, allegations concerning Ms. Mason also 
must be rejected as being fatally stale. See United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904, 104 S.Ct. 3405, , 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 686 
(1984); People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384, 391 (Colo. 1981) ("The 
grounds in an affidavit for a search warrant must have a 
relationship to the date and time that the warrant is issued."). 
Generalities and speculation about weapons and the 
possibility of their use are not a sufficient basis to risk the 
dangers posed by a no-knock warrant. See Tatman v. State, 320 A. 
2d 750, 751 (Del. 1974) ("an unsupported assertion of 'fear that 
the defendant might have a weapon'" insufficiently supported a good 
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faith belief that a no-knock entry was necessary); State v, 
Schmidt, 740 P.2d 351, 355 (Wash App. 1987) ("general speculation 
that a defendant may be armed and police safety endangered is not 
sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances excusing compliance 
with the knock and announce rule. ... An informant's statement that 
the defendant kept a weapon was not sufficient.11); State v. Piller, 
628 P.2d 976, 979 (Ariz. App. 1981) (it was not enough that 
officers knew the defendant "had negotiated for the purchase of a 
.357 magnum handgun and that there was a possibility of such a 
weapon being in the residence. Police knowledge of existence of a 
firearm excuses compliance with announcement requirements only 
where the officers reasonably believe the weapon will be used 
against them if they proceed with the ordinary announcement, and 
this belief must be based on specific facts and not on broad, 
unsupported presumptions"; "the need for compliance with the knock-
notice requirements is stronger where the police had knowledge of 
the presence of a weapon in the house and there is nothing to 
suggest that the occupants have a propensity to use the weapon 
against them, because there is more danger of a deadly encounter if 
the householder is startled by an unexpected intruder"); People v. 
Ouellette. 401 N.E.2d 507, 511 (111. 1979) (prior police knowledge 
of a defendant's possession of a handgun and pistol box does not 
justify a no knock search because the officer did not demonstrate 
that defendant was likely to use firearms, or that he presently 
unlawfully possessed them, or that he attempted to use weapons or 
had threatened the police) ; People v. Bennetto. 517 P.2d 1163, 1167 
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(Cal. 1974) ("where the police are aware of such a weapon, the case 
for requiring them to give notice of their authority and purpose 
becomes more rather than less compelling.1') (quoting People v. 
Dumas, 512 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Cal. 1973)); State v. Pierson. 472 
N.W.2d 898, 902 (Neb. 1991) ("The fact that a person is a member of 
a class of persons more likely to resist search is not sufficient 
to justify unannounced entry. The officers must have knowledge of 
specific facts that justify unannounced entry. The officers must 
have knowledge of specific facts that indicate that this particular 
person will conduct himself or herself in this manner when 
confronted by police."). 
The affidavit alleges that "[y]our affiant also knows 
from training and experience that the items sought pursuant to this 
search warrant are easily destroyed, hidden, or altered." Standing 
alone, this allegation is insufficient to justify a no-knock 
warrant. Police cannot support issuance of a no-knock warrant 
merely by reciting that household plumbing is present and drugs are 
involved. See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733 n. 3 ("more particularized 
showing may well be required if, for example, a large quantity of 
drugs is sought"). 
The affidavit plainly states "affiant was told that Vera 
Mason and Joseph Dowell were selling 'a large quantity of 
narcotics', from the premises." Aff. page three. The search 
warrant provides for search for scales, plastic bags, tape, paper 
bindles, syringes, bent spoons, pipes, glassware for making crack 
cocaine, residency papers, U.S. currency, and narcotic recordations 
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in addition to drugs. This case does not present the residential 
user situation of Rowe, where a small quantity of drugs for 
personal consumption may be rapidly disposed of or secreted. The 
bulk of the materials sought are not easily destroyed. 
Allowing no-knock warrants in any case involving drugs 
results in an almost "blanket rule." See 2 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 4.8(d), p. 280 (1987); People v. Gastelo. 432 P.2d 706 
(Cal. 1976). Universally allowing no-knock service whenever drugs 
are sought goes against the dictates of the fourth amendment and 
§ 77-23-10(2). See State v. Sparao. 639 P.2d 782, 784-5 (Wash App. 
1982); Gastelo, 432 P.2d at 707, 708; Parsley v. SUP. Ct. , 513 P.2d 
611 (Cal. 1973); State v. Bamber, 592 So.2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. App. 
2 Dist. 1991) ("we are not convinced that the existence of normal 
plumbing in one's home dispenses with the need to knock and 
announce during the execution of a warrant to search for small 
quantities of cocaine"). 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed the issue of whether the fourth amendment requires that 
notice be given before entry, such a notice requirement did exist 
at common law and can be "traced back as far as the decision in 
Semayne's Case, [5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603] in 1603." 
2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(a) at 270-1. The Supreme Court 
has addressed the closely related issue of notice prior to entry 
for purposes of making an arrest in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 
83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). In Ker the officers entered 
the premises without announcement by means of a pass-key. The 
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Supreme Court found the entry to be reasonable under the 
circumstances, but only because Ker possessed narcotics which could 
be quickly destroyed and because Ker had engaged in furtive 
behavior just prior to his arrest. Id. at 40-41. 
In this case, the fact situation which warranted issuance 
of a no-knock warrant no longer existed at the time of execution. 
Allegations concerning Mason and disposability of drugs are 
insufficient to independently justify no-knock execution of the 
warrant. 
As a result of the excessive force utilized in executing 
the warrant, all evidence obtained should be suppressed. The 
police misconduct implicates substantive rights under the fourth 
amendment. All evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution 
is inadmissible in state court. Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 655, 
81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961). 
2. Under Utah Law. 
Under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2), there was no sufficient proof 
to justify execution of the warrant in a no-knock manner. 
All argument under § I.A.I., supra, is equally applicable 
here and is incorporated by reference. Additionally, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23-10(2) requires "proof" before a magistrate may direct 
that a warrant may be executed without prior announcement. This 
requirement of proof sets a higher standard than the probable cause 
requirement under the fourth amendment and article I, section 14. 
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Even if this Court were inclined to rule that there was 
probable cause for a no-knock warrant under the fourth amendment, 
it should still hold that the "proof" requirement of § 77-23-10(2) 
has not been met. 
The proper remedy for the improper execution of the 
warrant in this case is suppression. "Where a statute establishes 
procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 
77-23-5 does [nighttime execution], violation of the statute cannot 
be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression 
of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the 
appropriate remedy." State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) , rev/d on other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 
(September 28, 1992). Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2) similarly 
involves procedures for protection of substantive rights, namely 
protection from use of excessive force in executing search 
warrants. Since the police never would have come in contact with 
Mr. Lee absent the improper search, all evidence seized on the 
premises and from Lee's person should be suppressed. 
B. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT 
APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
1. Under Federal Law. 
The issue of whether an officer relied in good faith on 
a warrant "is subject to de novo determination" by the appellate 
court. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on 
other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah, September 28, 1992) 
(citing United States v. Freitas. 800 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 
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1986)). There is no basis for asserting good faith execution of 
the warrant under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 
3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The federal good faith exception 
provides that where an officer acts in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant, the exclusionary 
rule does not apply. State v. Thompson 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 
1991). Officer Bassi, as affiant, detainer of Dowell, and executor 
of the warrant, had knowledge at the time of execution3 that Dowell 
was in custody. As in Rowe, one officer prepared the affidavit, 
secured the warrant, and executed the search. The same result, 
suppression, should pertain here.4 
Additionally, there can be no good faith where a search 
warrant was obtained through the bad faith of officers. A warrant 
premised on an affidavit containing material misrepresentations or 
omissions cannot be executed in good faith. "When the magistrate 
reviewing the affidavit in support of the search warrant is not 
presented with sufficient facts to determine probable cause, the 
warrant cannot be relied upon by searching officers." Rowe, 806 
P.2d at 737 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 915). 
3There is no evidence in the record, but the possibility 
exists that at the time of obtaining the warrant, Bassi intended to 
detain Dowell prior to execution of the warrant. This is precisely 
the type of police misconduct that should be sanctioned by 
application of the exclusionary rule. See State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 
700, 703 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
4Rowe was overturned because the execution of an arrest 
warrant provided the police with an independent justification for 
no-knock nighttime entry. Such independent justification is absent 
here. 
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2. Under Utah Law. 
Utah has not yet addressed whether the good faith 
exception is applicable to Article I section 14 of the Utah 
constitution. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 420 and n. 4. In footnote 8 
in Rowe, this Court noted: 
To date, neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court 
has held that a parallel doctrine to the Leon exception 
would apply in the context of Utah's exclusionary rule. 
Many state courts have determined that exclusionary rules 
existing by virtue of state constitutional provisions are 
not subject to a Leon-type "good faith" exception. See, 
e.g.. State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58, 68 
(1990); People v. Sundlincr, 153 Mich.App. 277, 395 N.W.2d 
308, 315 (1986), appeal denied, 428 Mich. 887 (1987); 
State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988); 
State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 857 
(1987); People v. Biaelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d 
630, 636-37, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457-58 (1985). 
806 P.2d at 737 n. 8. 
An "appendix" to Rowe traces the history of the 
exclusionary rule and the Leon "good faith" exception, concluding: 
As and when the appellate courts of this state 
are squarely confronted with the question of whether the 
exclusionary rule existing by virtue of Article I, 
Section 14, of the Utah Constitution is subject to a 
Leon-type "good faith" exception, a healthy skepticism 
should permeate the courts' consideration in view of the 
troublesome analysis in Leon. 
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 743. 
In his dissent in Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-960, Justice 
Brennan traced the history of the exclusionary rule and outlined 
the argument for rejecting a good faith exception under the fourth 
amendment. At the outset, he pointed out that the good faith 
exception is premised on the idea that the exclusionary rule is "a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
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rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right." 468 U.S. at 931, quoting Leon, 468 
U.S. at 906. Justice Brennan disagreed and reiterated the position 
he outlined in his dissent in United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 
338, 355-367, 94 S.Ct 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), that the 
exclusionary rule is constitutionally generated rather than 
judicially created. 
In State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d at 460, the Utah Supreme 
Court acknowledged Justice Brennan's dissent in Calandra and 
expressly left open the question of whether the exclusionary rule 
applicable to Utah constitutional violations was a constitutional 
requirement. Given the history and importance of the rule as well 
as the troubling and confusing federal analysis, this Court should 
determine that the exclusionary rule is mandated by the Utah 
constitution and is not merely a judicially created remedy. 
Therefore, no good faith exception can exist under the Utah 
constitution. 
Even if the federal good faith exception is applicable to 
Article I section 14, in this case Officer Bassi could not 
reasonably rely on the warrant. He knew that the basis for the no-
knock warrant was the possible presence of Dowell, knew that Dowell 
was in custody, and executed the warrant on a no-knock basis 
anyway. 
Further, there can be no good faith in any case where 
there are material omissions from the search warrant affidavit. 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-6. The state has an interest 
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in requiring its officers to make full disclosure to magistrates 
before search warrants are issued. 
POINT II. THE AFFIDAVIT WAS INVALID UNDER THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS A RESULT OF 
MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS OR OMISSIONS 
THAT INVALIDATE THE FINDING OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE. 
The fourth amendment to the United States constitution 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizure. 
In Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 155-6, 98 S.Ct. 
2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held 
that a defendant has a right to an evidentiary hearing where he or 
she makes a preliminary showing that a false statement was 
intentionally included in a search warrant affidavit, or was 
included with a reckless disregard for the truth, and such false 
statement was necessary to a finding of probable cause. At such 
hearing, if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the false statement was intentionally included, or 
included with a reckless disregard for the truth, the false 
material must be excised from the affidavit. The remaining 
information is reviewed for a determination as to whether it 
supports a finding of probable cause. If probable cause does not 
exist without the excised material, the search warrant must be 
voided and the items seized under the warrant excluded "to the same 
extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the 
affidavit.11 Id^ 
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In State v. Slowe. 728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1985), reh'q 
denied (1986), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "[f]alse 
statements in a probable cause affidavit made knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly, can invalidate a warrant issued in 
reliance thereon." In Slowe. the officers prepared the affidavit 
prior to a transaction which was part of a "sting" operation. The 
transaction occurred as anticipated, and the statements in the 
affidavit were, for the most part, accurate. Although the Court 
indicated that it did not condone the pre-preparation of search 
warrant affidavits, it nevertheless upheld the warrant because 
ff[t]he minor discrepancies that did occur did not undermine the 
essential truth of the allegations or rise to the level of 
knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly making a false statement." 
Id. at 111. 
In State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct 1565, 94 L.Ed.2d 758 (1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court again followed the fourth amendment analysis in 
Franks v. Delaware but extended that analysis to include material 
omissions as well as material misrepresentations. 
In Nielsenf the officer alleged in the affidavit that a 
confidential informant ("CI") had given him certain information; 
the officer also attested to the CI's reliability based on prior 
transactions with the CI. At the preliminary hearing, the officer 
essentially reiterated the statements in the affidavit. Id. at 
190. After the preliminary hearing, the State revealed that the 
affiant did not know or have contact with the CI and had received 
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the information in the affidavit from another officer who had 
worked with the CI. Id. 
The Supreme Court determined that the State's contention 
that the false statements were not made intentionally or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth was "entirely unpersuasive." Id. 
at 191. "Analyz[ing] the affidavit for probable cause by adding 
the information improperly omitted," fid, at 192 n. 2), the Court 
upheld the validity of the warrant "under federal law" because 
n[g]iven the totality of the circumstances, with the omitted 
information inserted, the affidavit amply supported the 
magistrate's finding of probable cause." Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 192. 
A. MATERIAL INFORMATION WAS OMITTED 
FROM THE AFFIDAVIT. 
In the present case, the officer omitted the following 
information: 
1. that CI was on probation; and 
2. that CI had at least one prior conviction 
for drug offenses. 
See R. 98-99. This information has direct bearing on the 
reliability of the information received from the CI. 
Furthermore, this information reflects on the reliability 
of the statements of Bassi himself. Bassi asserts that "Your 
affiant has not promised nor paid the CI anything for the 
information provided. Further CI has made statements against CI's 
own penal interest." In handwriting, the affidavit then states "CI 
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stated that he purchased narcotics at said premises.11 Aff. page 
three. 
Whether a probationer would voluntarily proffer to a 
probation officer that he had broken the law without first being 
promised something by someone.in return raises serious questions. 
Such an admission of a probation violation could only serve to land 
the probationer in jail. Had Officer Bassi revealed that CI was a 
probationer, the magistrate would have noticed that the logical 
consistency of these statements was suspect. The magistrate could 
also take into consideration that probation officers have 
considerable power and control over probationers. 
These material omissions falsely created the impression 
that information in the affidavit was more reliable than it 
actually was. The magistrate was denied an opportunity to fully 
assess whether probable cause existed. 
B. THE OFFICER ACTED INTENTIONALLY, 
KNOWINGLY, OR WITH A RECKLESS 
DISREGARD FOR THE TRUTH IN OMITTING 
MATERIAL INFORMATION. 
The officer in this case knew at the time he prepared the 
affidavit that the CI was on probation or parole. R. 98:23-99:4. 
He also was aware that this information was not disclosed in the 
affidavit. Id. The officer was further aware at the time he 
prepared the search warrant affidavit that CI had at least one 
conviction for a drug related offense. R. 99:5-14. 
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Under these circumstances, the officer acted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the 
truth. The officer knew the true facts concerning his CI. 
C. WITH THE OMITTED MATERIAL 
INFORMATION ADDED, THE AFFIDAVIT 
DOES NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Where material information is omitted from an affidavit 
either intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, 
Nielsen requires that the affidavit together with the omitted 
information be assessed for probable cause. "'Probable cause7 is 
a standard requiring the issuing magistrate to make a reasonable 
determination whether 'there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place./M 
State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989) (citing 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct 2317, 2332, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527, 548, reh'q denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 
L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983)). 
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the 
two pronged Aouilar-Spinelli test5 which had previously been 
followed in evaluating a search warrant affidavit based on an 
informant's tip, and embraced the broader "totality of the 
circumstances" test: 
5The two prong test evolved from Aauilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 
108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Soinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). The two 
prongs are: (1) the affidavit must establish the basis of the 
informant's knowledge, and (2) the affidavit must establish the 
informant's veracity and reliability. See discussion in § III.A., 
infra at p. 34. 
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The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 
including the "veracity"" and "basis of knowledge" of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-9. 
Utah has followed the United States Supreme Court in 
embracing the more general "totality of the circumstances" test in 
the fourth amendment context. See State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1983); State v. Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 
1989); State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1990). Although rigid compliance 
with the Acruilar-Spinelli guidelines may not be required under 
Gates, compliance with those guidelines may nevertheless "be 
necessary to make a sufficient basis for probable cause." Bailey. 
675 P.2d at 1205. 
Depending on the circumstances, a showing of the basis of 
knowledge and veracity or reliability of the person 
providing the information for the warrant may well be 
necessary to establish with a "fair probability that the 
evidence sought actually exists and can be found where 
the informant says. 
Id. 
In State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990), 
this Court stated: 
Although the Acruilar-Spinelli guidelines are not to be 
mechanically applied, they are useful even under the 
totality of the circumstances test for determining 
whether the facts establish probable cause. The United 
States Supreme Court has stated that veracity, 
reliability and basis of knowledge of an informant 
"should be understood simply as closely intertwined 
issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense 
practical question of whether there is probable cause to 
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believe that contraband or evidence is located in a 
particular place." Gates, 464 U.S. at 230, 103 S.Ct at 
2328; see \State v.1Hansen, 732 P.2d [127,] 130 (Utah 
1987); Droneburq, 781 P.2d at 1306. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
This Court emphasized in Droneburq the continuing need 
for the officer to include specific facts in a search warrant 
affidavit so that a neutral magistrate can adequately assess 
whether probable cause exists: 
"The fourth amendment requires that when a search warrant 
is issued on the basis of an affidavit, that affidavit 
must contain specific facts sufficient to support a 
determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause 
exists." The action of the magistrate, however, must not 
be "a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others." Otherwise, the magistrate becomes only a 
"rubber stamp" for police, abandoning the neutral and 
detached role which is "a more reliable safeguard against 
improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law 
enforcement officer." 
Droneburq, 781 P.2d at 1304 (citations omitted). 
In assessing whether probable cause exists where an 
affidavit does not contain specific facts regarding the veracity, 
reliability and basis of knowledge of the informant, courts look to 
the specificity and quantity of details supplied by the informant, 
along with the corroboration of such information by police officers 
or the obtainment of additional information by police officers. 
State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985), State v. 
Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983). In Droneburq, this Court 
held that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable 
cause. This Court pointed out that "[n]either the credibility of 
the informant nor the reliability of the information was ever 
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established." Id. at 1306. In addition, the "quantity of 
information" was insufficient to establish probable cause. 
In Bailey, the Supreme Court pointed out that although 
the informant's tip in Gates came from an anonymous letter, the 
affidavit was upheld because the informant supplied details as to 
the drug dealers' mode of operation, and the officer corroborated 
the information "in great detail" before obtaining a warrant. 675 
P.2d at 1206. The affidavit in Bailey indicated that the informant 
had "previously given truthful information to the police concerning 
the existence of contraband" and "the reliability of the informant 
was 'boosted by the detail with which the informant described his 
personal observation.'" Id. at 1206. 
Utah recognizes that "information from citizen informants 
who stand to gain nothing from providing information to the police 
is not viewed with the same rigid scrutiny as is the testimony of 
a regular police informant." Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206 (citing 
State v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1972). "Veracity is 
generally assumed when the information comes from an 'average 
citizen who is in a position to supply information by virtue of 
having been a crime victim or witness.'" State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 
175 (Utah 1983) (quoting 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.3 (1978)). 
See also State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992); 
Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 57-8 (Utah 
App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
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As a result of the material omissions by Officer Bassi, 
the affidavit must be examined for probable cause with the 
following statements added: 
1. CI is on probation; and 
2. CI has at least one prior drug-related 
conviction. 
These facts shed considerable doubt on the veracity and reliability 
of CI's statements. 
The affidavit asserts that the CI's information is 
reliable because (1) CI was not offered or paid anything for the 
information, and (2) CI made a statement against penal interest (CI 
had purchased narcotics). Aff. page three. 
Given CI's status as a probationer, CI/s assertions are 
less reliable than an average citizen's report. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether CI would proffer the information indicated in 
the affidavit without first receiving some promise from the police. 
Officer Bassi swore that the CI indicated that the CI had purchased 
heroin at the premises within the previous three days, and yet was 
promised nothing in exchange for this information. Aff. page 
three. Since CI faces criminal charges as a result of his 
admission, serious questions are raised as to CI's motive for 
revealing this information. Because the officer did not reveal 
this information to the magistrate, the magistrate was prevented 
from addressing these serious questions. Under these 
circumstances, the search warrant does not indicate that the CI is 
sufficiently reliable to support a finding of probable cause. 
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Absent the information provided by CI, the affidavit 
stands on the information provided by Van Katwyk's probationer. 
The affidavit states: 
Your affiant has interviewed Probation Officer 
Harvey Van Katwyk who told your affiant the following. 
Van Katwyk had been told by one of VanKatwyk's 
probationer's that Jack Sirstins, who was reportedly a 
Federal Fugitive, Vera Mason, and Joe Dowell were all 
three using and selling, cocaine and heroin at the listed 
premises. Further the probationer told VanKatwyk that 
the observations of the probationer were first hand. 
Further the most recent observation was within the last 
2 weeks. The probationer observed Joe Dowell using 
heroin and cocaine. Further the probationer observed 
Jack Sirstins and Vera Mason selling heroin and cocaine 
from the listed premises. 
Aff. page two. 
This probationer's information was thought to be reliable 
because (1) he was not offered or paid anything for the 
information, and (2) he was concerned about a friend who was 
purchasing and using heroin at the premises. Aff page two. It is 
important to note that Bassi revealed that information obtained 
through Officer Van Katwyk was obtained from a probationer. 
However, Officer Bassi only disclosed an informant's status as a 
probationer where it bolstered the credibility of the affidavit. 
This information helps explain why Mr. Bassi was relying on double 
hearsay information obtained by Mr. Van Katwyk from his 
probationer. 
Neither Van Katwyk's probationer's statements nor CI's 
statements are buttressed by any detail with which the facts in the 
affidavit are described. Cf. Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206, State v. 
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985), State v. Romero. 660 
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P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983). Affidavits should contain more than 
conclusory statements. Droneburg, 781 P. 2d at 1305. The 
informants' statements are not buttressed by independent 
verification or corroboration, beyond the simple facts that Vera 
Mason (who lived at the premises) and Joe Dowell were seen at the 
premises by Officer Bassi. Cf. Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102; 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 241, 103 S.Ct 2317, 2333, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527, 550, reh'cr denied. 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 
L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983). Surely the officers could have at least 
verified that Jack Sirstins was in fact a federal fugitive and that 
Mason in fact had a prior arrest for weapons and narcotics related 
offenses. Indeed, investigation into the circumstances of Mason's 
alleged (but unsubstantiated) prior arrest might have revealed some 
information to support issuance of a no-knock warrant. 
Van Katwyk#s probationer's information suffers from lack 
of specificity concerning the alleged drug sales, including 
information concerning frequency, amounts involved, and other 
persons involved. Besides lack of specificity, the information 
further suffers from lack of recency. The most recent observation 
was two weeks old. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States. 282 
U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931) (warrants are not to 
issue on the basis of "loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact"); 
Orr v. State. 382 So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1980) (reliable CI's 
claim that "within the past ten days" he had received information 
of another's drug possession was insufficient because CI did not 
state when drugs were actually possessed). The affidavit indicates 
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that the most recent observation was within the last two weeks, but 
does not indicate that the observation was anything more than that 
Sirstins, Mason, and Dowel1 were at the premises. 
While a certain amount of discretion is given to the 
magistrate to construe ambiguity in search warrant affidavits, 
requiring the magistrate to construe all ambiguities regarding 
timing in favor of recency would unduly extend such discretion. 
"It is one thing to expect the magistrate to give a 
commonsense reading to the facts set forth and to draw 
inferences from them. It is quite another thing to 
expect the magistrate to reach for external facts and to 
build inference upon inference in order to create a 
reasonable basis for his belief that a crime is presently 
being committed." 
2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(b) at 89 (quoting Commonwealth 
v. Simmons, 301 A.2d 819 (Pa. 1973)). Information in the affidavit 
is too stale to support a finding of probable cause. 
Under the totality of the circumstances with the omitted 
information added, the affidavit fails to support a finding of 
probable cause. 
The good faith exception of Leon is not applicable here. 
See discussion in §I.B.f supra at 19. 
POINT III. THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID 
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
A. THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI TEST SHOULD 
APPLY IN ASSESSING PROBABLE CAUSE 
UNDER SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has addressed 
the issue of whether the Acruilar-Spinelli test should be applicable 
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under the Utah constitution. The two-pronged Aauilar-Spinelli test 
requires that the affidavit in support of a search warrant set 
forth: 
(1) the basis of the informant's knowledge; 
and 
(2) facts establishing the credibility of the 
informant or the reliability of the information, 
Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114; Spinelli v. United States. 393 
U.S. at 413; Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1205. 
Various reasons exist for embracing the Acruilar-Spinelli 
test under the Utah constitution rather than the more nebulous 
"totality of the circumstances" test. 
Requiring officers to set forth in the affidavit the 
underlying facts and circumstances enhances the role of the neutral 
and detached magistrate. See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322 
(Alaska 1985); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 139 (Wash. 1984); 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(the magistrate 
must "make the proper independent judgment about the persuasiveness 
of the facts relied upon by the officer."). 
The two-pronged test provides a more practical, workable 
test than the more nebulous totality of the circumstances test, 
thereby providing greater assurance that Article I, section 14 will 
not be violated. As the court pointed out in Jones, 706 P.2d at 
322, the Acruilar-Spinelli test: 
has not reduced probable cause to a neat, artificial set 
of legal rules. "Rather, the two-pronged test provided 
a structure for probable cause inquiries, and if not 
rigidly applied, allowed sufficient room for assessment 
of the unique facts of the particular case." 
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Id. (citing LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3 at p. 136 (1984 
Supp.). 
As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent: 
Acruilar and Spinelli require the police to provide 
magistrates with certain crucial information. They also 
provide structure for magistrates' probable cause 
inquiries. In so doing, Aauilar and Spinelli preserve 
the role of magistrates as independent arbiters of 
probable cause determinations, and advance the 
substantive value of precluding findings of probable 
cause, and attendant intrusions, based on anything less 
than information from an honest or credible person who 
has acquired his information in a reliable way. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 287, 103 S.Ct. at 2357, 76 L.Ed.2d at 580. 
Various state courts have adopted the Aauilar-Spinelli 
test for analyzing search warrants under their state's 
constitution. State v. Jones. 706 P.2d at 317 (Alaska); State v. 
Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (Wash.); People v. Johnson. 488 N.E.2d 439 
(N.Y. Ct.App. 1985). See generally Note, United States v. Leon and 
Illinois v. Gates; A Call for State Courts to Develop State 
Constitutional Law, 1987 U.111.L.Rev. 311 (1987); Ryan, Is the Two 
Prong Test of Aguilar-Spinelli Alive and Well in California?. 13 
W.St.U.L.Rev. 45 (1985). 
Given the unique circumstances under which the Utah 
constitution was enacted, the preference for warrants under the 
Utah constitution (see State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 
1990)), and the more practical and workable guidelines of the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test, this Court should apply that test in 
assessing search warrants under Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
constitution. 
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B. AS A RESULT OF MATERIAL OMISSIONS 
AND FAILURE TO SATISFY THE AGUILAR-
SPINELLI TEST, THE SEARCH WARRANT IS 
INVALID UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
As outlined in § II.A., supra at 23, when reviewing an 
affidavit that suffers from material omissions the Court must 
assess the affidavit with the omitted information inserted. 
With the omitted information inserted, the affidavit 
fails to satisfy the Acruilar-Spinelli test. 
The affidavit indicates that information from Van 
Katwyk's probationer was obtained by first hand observation. 
However, the reliability of this information is not evident on the 
face of the affidavit. It indicates that the observations were 
alleged to be first hand, the probationer was not promised nor paid 
anything for the information, and the probationer was concerned 
about the welfare of a friend who was purchasing and using heroin 
at the named premises. Aff. page two. The affidavit does not 
indicate: 
(1) that this informant has been used before 
and been found to be reliable; 
(2) that the reliability of the information 
from the informant is boosted by the particularity with 
which details are described; or 
(3) that the police have corroborated any 
details (e.g., that the probationer actually has a friend 
buying heroin at the premises, that heroin and cocaine 
are actually being used at the premises) through 
independent investigation (except for the details that 
Vera Mason is occasionally at her home and that Joe 
Dowell occasionally is there with her). 
Further, the police did not attempt a controlled buy. Under the 
circumstances, there is nothing to indicate that the probationer's 
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story is anything but a complete fabrication to please his 
probation officer. 
Information from the CI is stated to be based on direct 
observation. The affidavit again recites that this CI was not 
promised nor paid anything for the information, and it further 
recites that CI had purchased heroin at the premises within the 
last three days. 
No particular detail that would bolster the reliability 
of the information is contained in the affidavit. Although the 
affidavit states that "when agents from AP & P conduct home visits 
at the named premises, persons inside the named premises flee from 
a side exit, for fear of being arrested for possession or use of 
narcotics," (aff. page two) the police failed to verify that AP & 
P actually conducts home visits at the premises. Even so, flight 
in the abstract is not sufficient to establish probable cause to 
arrest. State v. Elliott, 626 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1981). 
The simplest police work could have corroborated (or 
refuted) basic details of CI's story. The information in the 
affidavit is largely conclusory. See Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1305. 
As previously indicated it is questionable whether a probationer 
would voluntary proffer that he had purchased heroin without 
receiving some promise in return. Under these circumstances, the 
affidavit does not provide a substantial basis to support a finding 
of probable cause. 
No Leon-type good faith exception should exist under the 
Utah constitution. Even if it exists, it would not be applicable 
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under the facts of this case. See discussion in §I.B., supra at 
19. 
POINT IV. THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT NEXUS TO 
JUSTIFY ARREST OF MR. LEE. 
If this Court should uphold the validity of the search 
made pursuant to the search warrant, the police nevertheless had no 
probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee. The subsequent search of Mr. Lee 
pursuant to his arrest was therefore improper and the fruits of 
that search should be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471# 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, , 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 453 (1963). 
Reasonable cause for arrest without a warrant was been 
defined by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
"The determination should be made on an objective 
standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, 
and the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, 
a reasonable and prudent person in his position would be 
justified in believing that the suspect had committed the 
offense." 
State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. 
Hatcher. 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (Utah 1972). In the instant case, 
there was no sufficient probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee. 
Mr. Lee was arrested for possession of narcotics. R. 
110:10-12. The evidence in this case fails to show that Mr. Lee 
was in possession of narcotics. No narcotics were found on Mr. 
Lee. R. 110:22-24. The narcotics were found on a bed in the 
bedroom of Vera Mason. R. 93:8-12; 109:6-13. Mr. Robert Kersey 
was found by the bed with one hand touching the bed. R. 106:13-25. 
Mr. Kersey had fresh "track markings" on his arm. R. 107:1-7. No 
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personal belongings of Mr. Lee were found in the bedroom or on the 
bed. R. 109:20-22. 
The fact that Mr. Lee emerged from the room containing 
the narcotics is not determinative: 
[P]ersons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit 
drugs and who might even have access to them, but who 
have no intent to obtain and use the drugs can not be 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance. 
Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession 
where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that 
knowledge and ability. 
To find that a defendant had constructive 
possession of a drug or other contraband, it is necessary 
to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the 
accused and the drug to permit an inference that the 
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the drug. 
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). 
Ownership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the 
drugs are found, although important factors, are not 
alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, 
especially when occupancy is not exclusive. Some other 
factors which might combine to show a sufficient nexus 
between the accused and the drug are: incriminating 
statements made by the accused; incriminating behavior of 
the accused; presence of drugs in a specific area over 
which the accused had control, such as a closet or drawer 
containing the accused's clothing or other personal 
effects; [and] presence of drug paraphernalia among the 
accused's personal effects or in a place over which the 
accused has special control. 
Id. (cites omitted). None of the factors outlined in Fox is 
applicable to Mr. Lee. He made no incriminating statements, had no 
incriminating behavior, the drugs were not found in a specific area 
over which Mr. Lee had control, and Mr. Lee had no special control 
of any area of the premises or personal effects on the premises. 
In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991), this 
Court reversed a conviction for possession of cocaine. Defendant 
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was the driver and owner of a vehicle in which cocaine was found in 
the crack of the back seat. Two other individuals were in the 
vehicle at the time it was stopped. This Court held that there was 
no sufficient nexus between the defendant and the cocaine. In the 
present case, there was no sufficient nexus between Mr. Lee and the 
heroin found in Vera Mason's bedroom. 
There was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee. Absent 
probable cause, all evidence seized from Mr. Lee pursuant to the 
subsequent search at the Salt Lake County Jail (R. 115:18-116:2) 
should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Lee respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial judge's order denying his motion to suppress. The evidence 
obtained in the search of the premises should be suppressed. 
Evidence seized from the search of Mr. Lee should be suppressed as 
fruit of the poisonous tree. 
SUBMITTED this <-' day of December, 1992. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General/s Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this c^l day of 
December, 1992. 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of December, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM A 
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
NO 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the «tate of Utah. 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Agent 
Brad Bassi, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the persons off Verra Mason, A female black adult, DOB, 
3/21/40, 
( ) the vehicles described as 
(X) on the premises known as a 1442 South, Roberta Street, (240 
East) , the premises is on west side of the road, the apartment is on the 
southern most half of the four plex, #1, to include all containers, rooms, 
attics, and basements found therein. 
In the City of SALT LAKE, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now being possesr.ed or concealed certain property or evidence described 
is: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
rhich property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense or 
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct* 
ou are therefore commanded: 
(X) in the day time 
( ) at any time of the day (good cause having been shown) 
(x) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, 
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this 
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or 
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.) 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT 
CONTINUED 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR ROCK FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES. 
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS, 
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE, 
AND CUT MATERIAL. 
4. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
5. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
6. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS. 
7. HEROIN, A BLACK TAR LIKE SUBSTANCE, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and 
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find 
the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third 
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in 
your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this day of A!<= ,1991. 
JUDGE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OR^ 
MAGISTRATE OF THE 3RD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt take ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the persons of, Vera Mason, A female black adult, 
DOB, 3/21/40. 
( ) the vehicles described as 
(X) on the premises known as a 1442 South, Roberta 
Street, (240 East), the premises is on west side of the road, the 
apartment is on the southern most half of the four plex, #1, to 
include all containers, rooms, attics, and basements found therein. 
In the City of SALT LAKE, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now certain property of evidence described as: 
and that said property or evidence: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
[ ) consists of ai\ iteia or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2) 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT 
CONTINUED 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR RQCK FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES. 
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS, 
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE, 
AND CUT MATERIAL. 
4. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
5. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
6. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS. 
7. HEROIN, A BLACK TAR LIKE SUBSTANCE, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: 
Your affiant, Agent Brad Bassi, is employed by the State of 
Utah, Corrections Department, as a Parole Officer, assigned to 
Region Three, ISP. Your affiant has been a sworn peace officer in 
Utah for over 3 years. Your affiant has been involved in law 
enforcement employment for over 17 years in Utah. 
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and 
in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. 
Your affiant is investigating an illicit heroin, cocaine, and 
usage case, being conducted at the named premises, by the name 
persons on this affidavit/warrant. Your affiant has received 
information from a two separate sources of information. Your 
affiant* (has been- told by both sources of information that the 
person)*/listed aw" using and selling cocaine and heroin at the 
listed premises. 
Your affiant has interviewed Probation Officer Harvey Van 
Katwyk who told your affiant the following. Van Katwyk had been 
told by one of VanKatwyk's probationer's that Jack Sirstins, who 
was reportedly a Federal Fugitive, Vera Mason, and Joe Dowell, were 
all three using and selling, cocaine and heroin at the listed 
premises. Further the probationer told VanKatwyk that the 
observations of the probationer were first hand. Further the most 
recent observation was within the last 2 weeks. The probationer 
observed Joe Dowell using heroin and cocaine. Further the 
probationer observed Jack Sirstins and Vera Mason selling heroin 
and cocaine from the listed premises. 
VanKatwyk believes the information provided by the probationer 
is truthful and accurate for the following reasons. The 
observations were first hand. The probationer has not promised nor 
paid anything for the information. Further the probationer is 
concerned for the welfare of a friend that has been purchasing and 
using heroin at the named premises. 
Your affiant has interviewed a separate source of information 
herein after referred to as CI. Your affiant was told the 
following. CI has been inside the named premises and observed Vera 
Mason and Joseph Dowell's are selling cocaine and heroin at the 
named premises. Further the CI stated that the CI has observed 
Joseph Dowell's using narcotics at the named premises. Further the 
CI has stated that when agents from AP & P conduct home visits at 
the named premises, persons inside the named premises flee from a 
side exit, for fear of being arrested for possession or use of 
narcotics. 
PAGE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Your affiant was told by the CI that the most recent 
observation of narcotics sales and usage at the named premises was 
on December 21st, 1991. Further your affiant was told that Vera 
Mason and Joseph Dowell were selling " a large quantity of 
narcotics", from the named premises. CI has told your affiant that 
this illicit operation is ongoing, that Vera Mason has been selling 
narcotics out of the premises for a long period of time, and 
further that Joe Dowell has been assisting Vera Mason in the 
illicit operation for approximately 1 1/2 months. 
Your affiant believes that the information from the CI is 
accurate and truthful for the following reasons. Your affiant has
 si{/ 
not promised nor paid the CI anything for the information provided. / Px 
Further CI has made statements against CI's own penal interest. . ^_ 
Your affiant is the supervising parole officer for Joseph I^ J 
Dowell. Your affiant has reviewed Dowell's file and Dowell shows Wo^ 
prior arrest for bank robbery, (armed), burglary, and at least 4 aj^jfi^ 
prior arrest for distribution of a controlled substance. Dowell is 
currently on parole to the State of Utah for distribution of a 
controlled substance, heroin and cocaine. 
Further your affiant would like to advise the courts that 
Dowell has only been out of prison for approximately 2 months. 
Your affiant knows from experience and training, as a parole 
officer, that parolee's often, return to their criminal habits and 
criminal peer groups. 
Your affiant has been told by two separate sources that Dowell 
is selling and using cocaine and heroin at the named premises. Your 
affiant has been told that Vera Mason is also using and selling 
cocaine and heroin at the named premises. Your affiant has been to 
the named premises and have observed both individuals at the named 
premises. Further your affiant is aware that Vera Mason has a long 
history of substance abuse and sales. 
Your affiant believes that the operation is ongoing and there 
will be additional amounts of heroin and cocaine at the named 
premises. Your affiant has been told that the operation has been 
ongoing for several months. Your affiant has been told that the CI 
has made purchases of heroin from the named premises within the 
last 3 days. 
Further your affiant believes that the named premises should 
be searched for drug paraphernalia and packaging material. Your 
affiant believes that these items will be present for the following 
reasons. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these 
items are needed to ingest cocaine and heroin and to weigh out 
additional amounts for resale. Your affiant has been told by two 
sources that they have observed Dowell and Mason use narcotics. 
PAGE FOUR 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Your affiant prays for no-knock service of this warrant. Your 
affiant has reviewed the criminal history of DOWELL and he has a 
prior armed robbery. Further your affiant has been told that MASON 
has prior arrest for weapons and narcotics related offenses. 
Your affiant also knows from training and experience that the 
items sought pursuant to this search warrant are easily destroyed, 
hidden or altered. Further your affiant fears any delay in the this 
service of the search warrant will allow additional quantities of 
heroin and cocaine to be sold. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because: 
see body of affidavit 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
see body of affidavit 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a SEARCH WARRANT be issued 
for 'the seizure of said itenu,: 
(X) in the day time. 
( ) at any time during day or night because there is 
reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it 
being concealedf destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good 
reasons, to wit: 
It is further requested that (if appropriate )±he officer 
executing the requested warrant not be required to give notice of 
the officers authority or purpose because: 
(x) physical harm may result to any person if no Li* ,* 
were given, or 
(x) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed off, or secreted. 
The*danger is believed to exist becauses 
Brad Bassi 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this s*4 day of AJ)^^ 19?/ . 
In theJgfV <f>rrHTCourt 
In and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah 
